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Controlling Biotech Babies Following the
Transfer of Self-Replicating Inventions
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern biotechnology allows the production of transgenic animals
that have either unique characteristics or that produce a valuable
biological product.' Transgenic animals are developed by inserting
the gene coding for the unique characteristic or valuable product
into the genome of an animal. This gene is inserted into the genome
of the animal in such a way as to allow that gene to be passed on to
that animal's progeny through reproduction.3 Genes coding for regu-
lators, such as hormones, have been inserted into various mammals
causing alterations in the physical characteristics of the resulting
1. Van Brunt, Molecular Farming: Transgenic Animals as Bioreactor, 6 BIOTECH-
NOLOGY 1149-50 (1988).
2. Genes are inserted into a transgenic animal by injecting the gene containing the
desired genetic information for a particular trait into an embryo. This gene is then incor-
porated into the genetic material of the embryo so that the gene is carried along with
each cell of the embryo as it divides and grows into a mature animal. For a discussion of
the technical aspects of producing transgenic animals, see generally B. HOGAN, F. CON-
STANTINI & E. LACY, MANIPULATING THE MOUSE EMBRYO: A LABORATORY MANUAL
(1986) [hereinafter B. HOGAN].
Recently, transgenic animals have been produced using a technique that allows the
desired gene to be inserted into the genome of an animal at a specific location. See
Capecchi, Altering the Genome by Homologous Recombination, 244 Sci. 1288 (1989).
3. A transgenic animal generally has the useful gene inserted into all of its cells
including the germ cells (sperm or eggs). Because the transgenic animal's germ cells
contain the gene, sperm or eggs produced from those germ cells also contain the gene,
thereby allowing that gene to be passed on to progeny. The progeny would also have the
useful gene inserted into all of its cells. See generally B. HOGAN, supra note 2.'
transgenic animals such as growth rate and fat content of the
animal's meat.4 In other transgenic animals, genes coding for a
valuable biological product such as tissue plasminogen activator
(TPA) 5 have been inserted into transgenic animals in a manner that
results in the production of TPA in the milk of that animal.6
The first transgenic animals produced by modern biotechnology
have only recently been commercialized and widely distributed.7
Currently only transgenic mice are distributed but recent reports of
the production of transgenic cattle indicate that within only a few
years wide distribution and commercialization of transgenic cattle
will occur.8
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty9 laid down the rule that an invention made up of living
cells could not be treated as unpatentable subject mater simply be-
cause it was made up of living matter. Immediately after this deci-
sion the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) began granting patents
covering various organisms including yeasts and bacteria.
After subsequent court cases,10 the PTO began to allow patents
4. Palmiter, Brinster, Hamner, Trumbauer, Rosenfeld & Evans, Dramatic
Growth of Mice That Develop from Eggs Microinjected with Metallothionein-Growth
Hormone Fusion Genes, 300 NATURE 611 (1982).
5. Tissue plasminogen activator (TPA) is an enzyme that can dissolve blood clots
and is used in treating patients who have had myocardial infarctions (heart attacks). The
administration of TPA has been shown to reduce the tissue damage to the heart if ad-
ministered to patients having an acute myocardial infarction within 8-24 hours of the
acute event. See generally McNeill, Cunningham, Flannery, DaIzell, Wilson, Campbell,
Khan, Patterson, Webb & Adgey, A Double Blind Placebo Controlled Study of Early
and Late Administration of Recombinant Tissue Plasminogen Activator in Acute Myo-
cardial Infarction, 61 BRIT. HEART J. 316 (1989).
TPA has attracted much interest because it is one of the first genetically engineered
products to be widely used. Genetically engineered TPA was commercially developed by
Genetech and is sold under the name Activase. Important New Heart Attack Drug is
Patented, Bus. Wire, Jan. 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, OMNI File.
6. Pittins, A Milk Protein Promoter Directs the Expression of Human Tissue
Plasminogen Activator cDNA to the Mammary Gland in Transgenic Mice, 85 PROC.
NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 5874 (1988); Expression of Heterologous Proteins by Transgenic
Lactating Mammals, Int'l. Pat. App. No. WO 88/01648; Peptide Production, Int'l. Pat.
App. No. WO 88/00239; Schneider, Texas Researchers Develop 4 Gene-Altered Calves,
N.Y. Times, June 8, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 2; Ebert, A Moloney MLV-Ret Somatotropin
Fusion Gene Produces Biologically Active Somatotropin in a Transgenic Pig, 2 MOL.
ENDOCRINOL. 277 (1988); Simons & Land, Transgenic Livestock, 34 J. REPROD. FaRT.
SUPPL. 237 (1987).
7. The mice described in Leder & Stewart, Transgenic Non-Human Mammals,
U.S. Pat. No. 4,736,866 (1988), are currently being marketed by the Dupont Corp.
under the tradename Onco-Mouse. The Onco-Mouse contains at least one copy of the
myc oncogene making the mouse more susceptible to developing various tumors than
normal mice. The Onco-Mouse is used in medical research to screen various compounds
for potential carcinogenicity. See Customizing Animals From a Single Cell, Newsday,
Feb. 25, 1992, at 57.
8. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 6, at col. 2.
9. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
10. Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (B.P.A.I. 1985) (holding that the
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covering plants and animals.1' Thus, under current U.S. patent law,
any microbe, cell, plant, or animal may be patented as long as it
meets the requirements of patentability 2 set forth in title thirty-five
of the U.S. Code.' 3
Given that man-made animals can be patented 14 and the rapidly
expanding number of both issued patents' 5 and patent applications
on transgenic animals,' 6 the degree of control the patentee may exer-
cise over patented transgenic animals which have been transferred to
a third party using a sale,' 7 a field of use license,' 8 lease, 19 or bail-
ment20 becomes a critical consideration in deciding which type of
transfer to use.2 ' If the technology is transferred without sufficient
control over the technology's use, patentees risk losing all of their
research and development efforts expended to develop the
technology.
To determine which type of transfer to use, one must consider the
Plant Patent Act and the Plant Variety Protection Act do not prevent plants from being
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101); Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1425 (B.P. A.I. 1987).
11. 1077 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 24 (April 1987) (news release by Commissioner of
Patents on PTO position on animal patents).
12. For a general discussion of the patentability issues in the context of biotechnol-
ogy inventions, see Murashige, Section 102/103 Issues in Biotechnology Patent Prosecu-
tion, 16 A.I.P.L.A.Q.J. 294 (1989); Lentz, Adequacy of Disclosures of Biotechnology
Inventions, 16 A.I.P.L.A.Q.J. 314 (1989).
13. For any invention to be patented, it must meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 102, 103 and 112. See generally, D. CHISUM, PATENTS §§ 1.01-1.06, 3.01-3.08,
4.01-4.04, 5.01-5.06, 6.01-6.04 (1986). These sections of the U.S. Code set forth the
requirements that an invention be novel, non-obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the
art, and that the patent application describe the invention in sufficient detail to enable
others to make and use the invention.
14. See Diamond v. Chakrabary, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
15. Leder & Stewart, Transgenic Non-Human Mammals, U.S. Pat. No. 4,736,866
(1988); Evans, Palmiter & Brinster, Method of Obtaining Gene Product Through The
Generation of Transgenic Animals, U.S. Pat. No. 4,870,009 (1989); Meade & Lonberg,
Isolation of Exogenous Recombinant Proteins From The Milk of Transgenic Mammals,
U.S. Pat. No. 4,873,316 (1989); Wagner & Hoppe, Genetic Transformation of Zygotes,
U.S. Pat. No. 4,873,191 (1989); Cogburn, Endocrine Manipulation to Improve Body
Composition of Poultry, U.S. Pat. No. 4,929,600 (1990).
16. See Int'l. Pat. Apps. WO 88/01648 and WO 88/00239, supra note 6; Wall St.
J., July 6, 1989, § B, at 1.
17. See infra notes 88-115 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 116-42 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 148-59 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 145-47 and accompanying text.
21. Schneider, Farmers to Face Patent Fees to Use Gene-Altered Animals, N. Y.
Times, Feb. 16, 1988, § A, at 16; Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms:
The Patent System and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051 (1988).
amount of control that may be maintained over the transferred arti-
cle under the patent law doctrines of exhaustion,22 implied license to
practice a patented process,23 implied license to repair a patented
product,2 4 and field of use licenses.25 In addition, the limits placed on
these controls by antitrust law must also be determined.
26
This Comment will set forth three separate hypothetical trans-
genic inventions and a specific transfer of each invention. Each hypo-
thetical invention will be described and classified as either a product
or a machine.2 7 After describing and classifying these transgenic in-
ventions, this Comment will then consider the amount of control
maintained by the patentee under the patent law doctrines and anti-
trust law after transferring those inventions using an unconditional
sale, a field of use license, a bailment, or a lease.
II. THREE CLASSES OF TRANSGENIC ANIMALs: Two MACHINE
AND ONE PRODUCT
To aid in determining the amount of control a patentee maintains
after transferring each of the three hypothetical inventions addressed
by this Comment, each invention will be classified as either a prod-
uct or a machine. This product versus machine distinction is impor-
tant because patent and antitrust law allow a different amount of
post-transfer control to be maintained by the patentee depending on
whether the transferred article is a product 28 or machine.2 9
22. The patent law doctrine of exhaustion states that once the patentee has sold a
patended article, the patentee cannot restrict that article's use. See infra notes 57-67 and
accompanying text.
23. An implied license to practice a patended process arises when a patentee sells
an article that can only be used in a patented process. See infra notes'73-78 and accom-
panying text.
24. A purchaser of a patented article receives an implied license to repair the pat-
ented article so as to maintain its fitness for use. See infra notes 79-87 and accompany-
ing text.
25. Under a field of use license, a patentee can license the patented technology for
use only to produce a certain type of product. See infra notes 116-31 and accompanying
text.
26. A patentee can only prevent others from making, selling or using the patented
article or process. The patentee cannot attempt to control related technology or products
without violating antitrust laws. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 28-51 and accompanying text.
28. Munters Corp. v. Burgess Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1195, 1204 n.6 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), affd, 201 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 756, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (non-manufacturing vendor
of a product cannot impose restrictions on the use of the product sold). In United States
v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489-90 (1926), the Court stated:
It is well settled, as already said, that where a patentee makes the patented
article, and sells it, he can exercise no future control over what the purchaser
may wish to do with the article after his purchase. It has passed beyond the
scope of the patentee's rights .... But the question is a different one which
arises when we consider what a patentee who grants a license to one to make
and vend the patented article may do in limiting the licensee in the exercise of
the right to sell.
29. Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 109 F. Supp. 657 (S.D.N.J. 1951), modi-
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In general, biological inventions, such as transgenic animals, are
very difficult to classify as either a product or a self-replicating ma-
chine in all potential commercial embodiments and situations.
However, in specific situations and embodiments, a transgenic
animal invention with a particular set of characteristics may be con-
sidered a self-replicating machine that makes copies of itself through
reproduction in order to fulfill its intended use.30 A self-replicating
machine's intended use may be primarily to produce a product, such
as a protein, a useful waste product, or milk.3' Alternatively, the
self-replicating machine's intended use may be to produce more self-
replicating machines."2 In addition to producing copies of itself, a
self-replicating machine is not destroyed during its intended use.33
In other specific situations and embodiments, a transgenic animal
invention with a set of particular characteristics may be considered a
product that is not required to reproduce itself to fulfill its intended
use. 4 A product's intended use might be as a starting material for
another product such as food or glue. 5 A product is destroyed, or at
least converted to a different form, during its use. A transgenic
animal product would typically be slaughtered and thus destroyed as
a first step in its use.
To determine whether a particular transgenic animal is a product
or a self-replicating machine, its intended use under a given set of
circumstances must be determined. 6 If that use requires the trans-
genic animal to reproduce itself in order to fulfill its intended use
and that animal is not destroyed during that use, the transgenic
animal would be classified as a self-replicating machine. 37 However,
fled, 207 F.2d 509 (3rd Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954) (patentee of a
machine can control the product produced by that machine). In this Comment, the ma-
chine classification also includes a process that produces a product.
30. This self-replicating machine can be considered a manufacturing process mak-
ing the possessor of such a machine a manufacturer under the meaning set forth in
Munters Corp. v. Burgess Indus., 450 F. Supp. 1195, 1204 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
31. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. Self-replicating machines are
capable of reproducing themselves and thus producing another machine.
32. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
33. Normally an animal is not killed during reproduction or during milking.
34. The product is entirely made and therefore the possessor of a product cannot
be considered a manufacturer under Munters Corp. v. Burgess Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp.
1195, 1204 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
35. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
36. American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882) (holding that a
patentee's intent that a patented article be used only once was controlling in determining
infringement questions).
37. Because there is reproduction, the possessor of the self-replicating machine is
if a particular transgenic animal is not required to reproduce itself to
fulfill its intended use and is not destroyed during that use, the trans-
genic animal would be classified as a product.
38
To illustrate the differences between transgenic animals that are
used as a self-replicating machine or product, the following three hy-
pothetical transgenic animal inventions will be addressed.
A. Transgenic Animals Used as a Specialized Source of Food
A transgenic animal expressing a growth modulating substance,3"
such as growth hormone,40 has an altered growth rate and ultimately
produces meat with a lower fat content than traditional animals
raised for food.4' Typically, low-fat meat transgenic animals would
be produced from parental breeding stock retained by the patentee
or a licensee and then transferred to a third party. This transfer
would occur while the animal was young, and the third party would
feed and care for the animal while it matured to a point where it
would be slaughtered to fulfill its intended use as food. The use of
this transgenic animal would be similar to the use of standard
"feeder cattle" where the third party, usually a farmer, does not
maintain breeding stock to produce animals to fatten for ultimate
use as food, but rather purchases young animals from a supplier who
maintains the breeding herd.
In this situation, the farmer's intended use does not depend on the
reproduction of the transgenic animals, and such reproduction is ac-
tually detrimental to the final food product produced as evidenced by
the sterilization of most, if not all, male animals used in this type of
meat production.42 Female animals used in this type of operation
have traditionally not been sterilized and thus could be used to pro-
duce progeny if desired.43
The transgenic animal used in this manner appears to be accu-
rately classified as a product rather than a machine because the
transgenic animal is not required to reproduce itself and is destroyed
considered a manufacturer. See supra note 30.
38. Because there is not any reproduction, the possessor of the product is not a
manufacturer. See supra note 34.
39. Pursel, Pinkert, Miller, Bolt, Campbell, Palmiter, Brinster & Hammer, Ge-
netic Engineering of Livestock, 244 Sci. 1281 (1989) [hereinafter Pursel].
40. Miller, Growth Hormone Genes Bring Super Pigs Closer to Market, 6 GE-
NETIC ENG. NEWS 7 (May 1987); Moffet, Fish Incorporate Rat Growth Hormone Genes,
7 GENETIC ENG. NEWS 1 (Sept. 1987); Palmiter, Metaellothionein-human GH Fusion
Genes Stimulate Growth of Mice, 222 Sci. 809 (1983).
41. Pursel, supra note 39, at 1285.
42. Lesser, Applying Animal Patents in Agriculture: Lessons for Farmers and the
Patent Office for Self-Reproducible Animals, ANIMAL PATENTS: THE LEGAL, ECONOrI1C
AND SOCIAL IssuEs 343, 345 (1989) [hereinafter Lesser, Applying Animal Patents].
43. Id.
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in fulfilling its intended use.44
B. Transgenic Animals Used to Produce Valuable Products or
By-Products
A transgenic animal producing a valuable biological product or
by-product in its milk is an economical way of producing large
amounts of therapeutically useful compounds.45 In a typical transfer,
a transgenic animal secreting a product would be obtained from
breeding stock maintained by the patentee and transferred to a third
party manufacturer who specialized in the production and sale of the
valuable biological product. This transfer to the manufacturer would
occur after the patentee has verified that the transgenic animal is
secreting the desired biological product. If the transgenic animal is
making the biological product in its milk, the animal must be bred in
order to maintain milk production. This breeding or reproduction
would result in the production of progeny that, depending upon the
particular genetic characteristics, would also produce, or at least
carry, the gene controlling the production of the biological product.4
In addition, the transgenic animal is not destroyed while fulfilling its
intended use of producing a product, such as milk. The use of this
transgenic animal would be similar to the use of a standard dairy
animal in that some of the progeny produced would be sold, typically
all male progeny and some female progeny, and some of the female
progeny would be retained and used to replace older animals in the
herd.
This transgenic animal is a self-replicating machine because the
transgenic animal must reproduce itself and is not destroyed in fulfil-
ling its intended use.
48
44. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
45. Schmeck, Gene Altered Mice Make Human Protein in Their Milk, N.Y.
Times, Oct 27, 1987, § C, at 1; Gordon, Production of Human Tissue Plasminogen
Activator in Transgenic Mouse Milk, 5 BIOTECHNOLOGY 1183 (1987); Newark, Protein
Production in Transgenic Animals, 5 BIOTECHNOLOGY 874 (1987).
46. S. BENT, R. SCHWAAB, D. CONLIN, & D. JEFFERY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY WORLDWIDE 283 (1987) [hereinafter S. BENT, INTEL. PROP.
RTs.].
47. Hammer, Production of Transgenic Rabbits, Sheep and Pigs by Microinjec-
tion, 318 NATURE 680 (1985).
48. S. BENT, INTEL. PROP. RTs., supra note 46, at 281.
-943
C. Transgenic Animals Used to Introduce a Special
Characteristic into a Herd
A transgenic animal carrying a gene conferring on that animal a
desired characteristic, such as exceptional hardiness, greater longev-
ity, or cancer susceptibility is very useful when used as breeding
stock to introduce that characteristic into an entire generation of
progeny. Typically, a male or female transgenic animal carrying the
desired gene would be produced by the patentee and transferred to a
third party who uses the transgenic animals to produce one or more
generations of progeny having the desired trait.49 In all cases, the
transfer would occur after the patentee has verified that the trans-
genic animals have the desired trait.
The transfer of a transgenic animal to be used to introduce a de-
sired trait into a herd requires that the transgenic animal reproduce
itself and produce progeny. This use of a transgenic animal would be
similar to the use of ordinary purebred breeding stock in that the
parental or grandparental transgenic animals are used to produce
progeny, and some progeny are kept as breeding stock and the rest
sold for slaughter. The transgenic animal would not be destroyed
during its intended use of producing progeny. Some female progeny
are retained as breeding stock in order to increase the herd size. 0
This transgenic animal used to introduce a special characteristic
into a herd appears to be a self-replicating machine because the
transgenic animal must reproduce itself and is not destroyed in fulfil-
ling its intended use.51
III. THE METHOD OF TRANSFERRING TRANSGENIC ANIMALS
DRAMATICALLY ALTERS THE PATENTEE'S POST-TRANSFER CONTROL
Several possible methods of transferring transgenic animals to the
ultimate users include sales, licenses, leases, and bailments. The use
of these transfer methods with the three classes of transgenic ani-
mals will be discussed to probe the amount of control that can be
placed on transferred transgenic animals under the current patent
and antitrust law.52 In addition, the particular control advantages
and disadvantages of transferring transgenic animals using each
method will be determined.
The interaction of patent law and antitrust law is complex and
49. Lesser, Applying Animal Patents, supra note 42, at 351 (the current practice
in the poultry industry is for breeders to release parent or grandparent birds to hatcheries
under a contract that restricts release of breeding stock).
50. Lesser, Applying Animal Patents, supra note 42, at 348.
51. S. BENT, INTEL. PROP. RTs., supra note 46, at 281.
52. Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act and
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine On Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38
DRAKE L. REV. 175 (1989).
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longstanding.53 In general, patent law addresses the creation and
commercial exploitation of a limited monopoly granted by the patent
statute.54 Antitrust law addresses various limits placed on any mo-
nopoly, including the monopoly granted to the patentee by the patent
statute.55
A. Transfer Using an Unconditional Sale
An unconditional sale is a transaction where a patented article is
exchanged for an agreed upon price and the article is transferred to
the purchasee upon the payment of the price.56 The unconditional
sale of a patented product by an authorized seller exhausts the pat-
entee's rights in that article with regard to that product.57 The basic
underlying principle of the patent exhaustion doctrine is that the
patentee has received fair and just compensation by the first sale of
the product and the limited exclusivity granted by the patent does
not entitle the patent owner to more than this.58 In United States v.
Singer Manufacturing Co.,59 the Supreme Court stated,
Beyond the limited monopoly which is granted, the arrangements by which
the patent is utilized are subject to general law, . . . and it is equally well
settled that the possession of a valid patent or patents does not give the
patentee any exemption from the provisions of the Sherman Act 0 beyond
the limits of the patent monopoly. 61
The patent exhaustion doctrine has been applied to restrictions on
the use, the resale, and the resale price placed on a patented article
53. Id. at 178 n.6.
54. Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1025 (1980).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1912), overruled on
other grounds, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917).
57. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456-57 (1873). The court stated,
"When the patentee, or the person having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose
sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its use and he parts with the right
to restrict that use. The article ... passes without the limit of the monopoly."
58. Comment, The Nature Of A Patent Right, 17 COLUM. L. REv. 663 (1917);
Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. at 456 (1873) ("[T]he patentee or his assignee having in the
act of sale received all the royalty or consideration which he claims for the use of his
invention in that particular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser
without further restriction on account of the monopoly of the patentees.").
59. 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
60. 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
61. U.S. v. Singer, 374 U.S. at 196-97 (quoting U.S. v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S.
265, 277 (1942)).
that is sold.62 In United States v. Univis Lens Co.,6 3 the court held
that "the authorized sale of an article which is capable of use only in
practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the patent monopoly
with respect to the article sold. ' 64 Other decisions after Univis Lens
Co. indicate that the decision is limited to the article sold and in no
way allows the purchaser65 to "make" a new article and sell it to
another without being liable for infringement of the patent. 6 There-
fore, any unauthorized reproduction of a transgenic animal invention
would be patent infringement.67
All transgenic animals, including self-replicating machines and
products, are equally subject to the patent exhaustion doctrine, and
thus the patent rights in the transgenic animal sold are exhausted.
Once the patent monopoly in the transgenic animals is exhausted,
any restrictions placed on the, use of those animals is analyzed and
subject to invalidation under antitrust law.
1. Antitrust Limitations on Use Restrictions Imposed
After the First Sale of a Patented Article
The exhaustion of the patent monopoly after the first authorized
sale of an article allows any post-first-sale restrictions placed on the
use of a patented article to be subject to invalidation under antitrust
law. 8 Once stripped of patent protection by exhaustion, restrictions
placed on the patented article are either illegal per se69 or subject to
62. See, e.g., 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 19.04[3] n.72 (1986); Bauer & Cie v.
O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913) (attempted to set resale price of a patented article); Straus
v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917); Boston Store of Chicago v. American
Gramphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, 25 (1918) (held the patent right did not allow the pat-
entee to violate general law regarding price restrictions).
63. 41 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), affd in part, revd in part, 316 U. S. 241
(1942).
64. 316 U.S. at 249 (emphasis added).
65. See, e.g., Security Materials Co. v. Mixermobile Co., 72 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.
Cal. 1947) (post-sale restriction found enforceable by infringement action).
66. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1991); Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913);
Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 936 (5th Cir 1971), rev'd in part,
406 U.S. 518 (1972).
67. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1991) (reproduction appears to be making under this
statute).
68. Ethyl Gasoline Corp v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 457-58 (1940); United
States v. Ciba Geigy Corp., 508 F. Supp. 1118, 1147 (D.N.J. 1976) (non-competition
agreement viewed as restraint on trade).
69. United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967), overruled
in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977). The per se rule
was overruled on the facts of Continental T.V., but the Court left open the possibility of
using the per se rule in other situations. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977). The per se rule, which was replaced by the rule of reason articu-
lated in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S 231 (1918), stated that "the
true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition." Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
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antitrust analysis under the antitrust "rule of reason. 7 0
However, an antitrust cause of action will not be found until the
patented article has been sold and the patent exhaustion doctrine
moves the article outside the patent monopoly making the article
subject to antitrust law. 71 Post-sale restrictions placed on either a
self-replicating machine or product are similarly subject to invalida-
tion under antitrust law, making such restrictions useless in attempt-
ing to maintain any post-transfer control by the patentee.
7 2
2. Implied Licenses Attaching to a Purchased Product
a. Implied License to Use a Patented Article Purchased
The purchaser of any patented article, including a product or self-
replicating machine, "undeniably acquires the right to use the article
for all purposes of the patent so long as it endures. 7 3 Therefore,
when a patentee sells a patented article to a purchaser, the purchaser
acquires an implied license to practice a patented process if the only
use of the article is to practice a patented process. 74 This implied
license is only as general as the parties intend 5 and is limited in
scope to the use of the patented article in the condition it was
purchased.
7 1
When a patentee sells a self-replicating machine and at least lim-
ited reproduction is required to use the self-replicating machine, the
This determination requires that the court consider the particular conditions present in
the business to which the questionable restriction is applied both before and after the
restriction is imposed and the nature of the particular restriction and its probable or
actual effect. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238; Continental T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at
49-50 n.15. In addition, the courts consider the intended result of the restriction and the
history of the restriction. Munters Corp. v. Burgess Industries, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1195,
1207-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 201 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 756, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
70. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); White Mo-
tor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
71. Munters Corp. v. Burgess Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1195, 1205 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), affid, 201 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 756, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
72. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
73. Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1, 19 (1912), overruled on other grounds,
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502 (1917).
74. Pettibone Corp. v. Fargo Mach. & Tool Co., 447 F. Supp. 1278, 1281 (E. D.
Mich. 1978); Bandag Inc., v. Lewis General Tire Inc., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 745, 754
(W.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942).
75. General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 349 F. Supp.
345, 363 (N.D. Ohio 1972), modified, 351 F. Supp. 872 (N.D. Ohio 1972), modified in
part and vacated in part, 489 F. 2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932
(1974); Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 232 U.S. 413, 418-419
(1914); Aralac, Inc., v. Hat Corp. of America, 166 F.2d 286, 293 (3d Cir. 1948).
76. National Cash Register Co. v. Grobet, 153 F. 905, 907 (2d Cir. 1907).
purchaser is granted an implied license to make those articles re-
quired for use of the self-replicating machine. 7  However, the pur-
chaser of a transgenic animal product would not acquire an implied
license to make new transgenic animals through reproduction, be-
cause the transgenic animal product is intended to be slaughtered
and not reproduced. 8
b. Implied License to Repair the Article Purchased
In addition to the implied license to use a purchased article, the
purchaser of a patented article, including a self-replicating machine
or a product, acquires the right to repair that patented article when
necessary to maintain its fitness for use.79 This permissible repair
includes the right to replace the individual unpatented parts of a
larger patented combination or machine.80 However, this permissible
repair is limited at the point where the repair amounts to a complete
reconstruction of a spent or worn out product.81
The Supreme Court laid down the general rule used to distinguish
bermissible repair from impermissible reconstruction by stating,
"[R]econstruction of a patented entity, comprised of unpatented ele-
ments, is limited to such a true reconstruction of the entity as to in
fact make a new article,... after the entity, viewed as a whole has
become spent. ..,"2 This rule emphasizes determining whether there
has been a "second creation" of a patented invention after the inven-
tion has become spent.83
In addition to determining whether an article has been recreated,
at least one subsequent court has found that reconstruction has
occurred when not a single element of an invention has been left
untouched during a repair process84 and has given weight to the
patentee's intent in deciding whether there has been impermissible
reconstruction. Thus it appears that if the patented article is in-
tended to be used only once, the implied license to repair that article
77. Illingworth v. Spaulding, 43 F. 827 (C.C.N.J. 1890); United States Indus.,
Inc. v. Otis Eng'g Corp., 277 F.2d. 282 (5th Cir. 1960).
78. See Lesser, Applying Animal Patents, supra note 42, at 345 and accompany-
ing text.
79. Goodyear Shoe Mach. Co., v. Jackson, 112 F. 146, (1st Cir. 1901); Aro Mfg.
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961) [hereinafter Aro I].
80. Aro I, 365 U.S. 336, 345 (1961); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replace-
ment Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964) [hereinafter Aro II].
81. Aro I, 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961) (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1945)).
82. Aro I, 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961).
83. Id.
84. Connecticut Tel. & Elec. Co. v. Automotive Equip. Co. 14 F.2d 957, 961
(D.C.N.J. 1926), affd, 19 F.2d 990 (3rd Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 564 (1927).
85. See, e.g., In re Certain Steel Rod Treating Apparatus, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
37 (U.S. Int. Tr. Com. 1981).
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does not allow its reconstruction by replacement of every element
that makes up the patented article. 8
Therefore, a transgenic animal product intended for a one time
use cannot, under the doctrine of permissible repair, be reproduced
because every element of that patented transgenic animal product is
being replaced. In this situation, the replacement occurs simultane-
ously through reproduction, making this impermissible recon-
struction. 7
3. Analysis of Sales of Three Types of Transgenic
Animals
If antitrust limitations are the doctrines of patent exhaustion, im-
plied license and permissible repair apply to a particular transfer of
a transgenic animal and will tend to severely limit the control a pat-
entee maintains over the use of that animal by the transferee. If a
particular use of a transgenic animal is found to be impermissible
reconstruction, this reconstruction is not permitted and the trans-
feree is liable for patent infringement.8 8 Therefore, in each of the
three types of transgenic animals, the applicability of each of these
doctrines must be determined.
a. Sales of Transgenic Animal Used as a Specialized Food
Source
The sale of a transgenic animal used as a specialized food source
can be viewed as a sale of a product. 89 The patent exhaustion doc-
trine clearly applies to the actual transgenic animal sold. However,
patent rights are not exhausted in articles that are made by the
purchaser through reproduction, and thus, with respect to newly
produced animals, the purchaser is liable for infringement.90 The
doctrine of implied license would not expand the purchaser's license
beyond the ability to raise the animal for a sufficient time for
slaughter.
86. See, e.g., Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1963); American
Cotton-Tie v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882).
87. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
88. American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882); see generally,
Sease, Patent Law: Repair-Reconstruction A Review, Analysis, and Proposal, 20 DRAKE
LAW REV 85 (1970).
89. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
90. "[W]hoever wiihout authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention,
within the United States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." 35
U.S.C. § 271(a) (1991).
Because the patent rights on this transgenic animal are exhausted
by the first sale, any restriction, express or implied, would be subject
to analysis under antitrust law. It is unlikely that any restrictions on
the purchaser as to the use of the purchased transgenic animal would
be upheld under the United States v. Arnold Schwinn9' decision.
The doctrine of permissible repair of this class of transgenic ani-
mals would certainly allow any treatment of the animal required to
maintain its fitness for future use as a special food. However, the
purchased transgenic ahimal may not be repaired to the point of
recreating the transgenic animal.92 Clearly, the producing of a new
transgenic animal by reproduction would be considered reconstruc-
tion because not a single element of the invention, the entire trans-
genic animal, is left untouched9" and the patentee intended that the
purchased transgenic animal would only be used once and not
reproduced.
Under patent law the patentee should be able to successfully bring
a patent infringement action against the purchaser who reproduces a
transgenic animal that was intended to be used as a specialized food
source.94.However, infringement actions are limited to cases where a
purchaser is involved in large scale reproduction of the transgenic
animal because of the costs and complexities of such actions."
b. Sale of a Transgenic Animal Used to Produce Valuable
Product
Selling a transgenic animal used to produce a valuable product
can be viewed as the sale of a machine capable of producing a valua-
ble product. 96 In addition, this type of transgenic animal will pro-
duce additional transgenic animals because of the breeding required
to maintain production of the valuable product in its milk.9
7
The initial sale of a transgenic animal machine used to produce a
valuable product exhausts the patent rights in that machine and also
gives the purchaser the implied license to produce additional trans-
genic animals from that machine. However, this does not necessarily
91. 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (holding post-sale restrictions on a patented article are
illegal per se).
92. Isolation of the gene that confers the special trait upon a transgenic animal
and introduction of that isolated gene into a new animal would be an example of recon-
struction without sexual reproduction.
93. Goodyear Shoe Mach. Co. v. Jackson, 112 F. 146 (C.C.D. 1901).
94. See supra note 90.
95. It is unlikely that a purchaser who does not significantly effect the patentee's
market position would be sued because of the high costs of most patent litigations.
96. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
97. See S. BENT, INTEL. PROP. RTs., supra note 46, at 283 and text accompanying
note 46.
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mean that, given a right to make these additional transgenic ani-
mals, the right to sell them is also granted. 98
The right to make a patented product generally implies the right
to use the product made because without the right to use the pat-
ented product made, the license to make the product is useless. 99
However, in this particular case, an implied license to make does not
create an implied right to use the articles made. The making of the
articles has value because the incidental transgenic animals were
made in the process of producing milk containing a valuable produci.
This unique situation would seem to be an exception to the general
rule that any license to make creates an implied license to use the
article made.100 The possibility that an implied license to make car-
ries with it an implied license to use-the articles made forces a con-
sideration of whether the impermissible reconstruction doctrine will
allow the patentee to exert any control over the incidentally pro-
duced transgenic animals.
The patentee's likely intent in selling the parental animal is to al-
low the incidentally produced transgenic animals to be nmade and
then sold to be slaughtered as food and therefore would not dilute
the patentee's market position. The incidental production of the
transgenic animals results in the replacement of every element that
makes up the patented article and would be considered reconstruc-
tion.10' This reconstruction would act to terminate any implied li-
cense associated with these animals making the purchaser liable for
patent infringement if the patentee brought an enforcement
action.'02
The producer of the incidental transgenic animals, armed with the
knowledge that a patent infringement suit might be brought, would
be unlikely to agree to the purchase of the original transgenic animal
without an express license allowing the purchaser to dispose of the
incidentally produced animals in some manner. This license might
take the form of a field of use limitation such as the licenses dis-
cussed below.
The exact disposition of the incidentally produced transgenic ani-
mals produced incidentally to the production of milk from this par-
ticular class of transgenic animal is uncertain under current patent
98. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
99. 6 LIPSCOMB'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 20:7 (3d ed. 1987).
100. See, e.g., Poirier v. Bradford, 119 Minn. 475, 138 N.W. 687 (1912); Curtiss
Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 266 F. 71 (2d Cir. 1920).
101. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 90.
law. Therefore, the unconditional sale of such a transgenic animal
should be avoided, and either a field of use license, leasing of the
animal,103 or a bailment1 04 of the animal should be considered.
c. Sale of Transgenic Animals Used to Introduce a Special
Characteristic into a Herd
Selling a transgenic animal used to introduce a special character-
istic into a herd can be viewed as a biological machine that is used to
produce more transgenic animals having a particular desirable
trait.215 The patent exhaustion doctrine clearly applies to the partic-
ular animal sold. Patent rights are not exhausted in the transgenic
animals made by the purchaser through breeding, and without either
an express or an implied license to make, use, and sell these animals,
the purchaser would be liable for infringement.
The patent rights in the transgenic animal sold are exhausted and
any express or implied restriction on the use of that animal would
likely be considered a violation of antitrust law. 108 Any restriction on
the use of progeny produced by the purchased transgenic animal
would be analyzed separately under antitrust law. 10 7 Because the
patent rights are not exhausted in the progeny of the purchased
transgenic animal, antitrust law would not automatically invalidate
any restriction placed upon these animals. 08
The doctrine of permissible repair applied to this class of trans-
genic animals would allow treatment of the transgenic animal to
maintain its fitness for use in the purchaser's breeding program. 09
Repair of the purchased transgenic animal to the point of recreating
it, in this case reproducing, would be considered impermissible re-
construction and thus would not be allowed."' The production of
new transgenic animals from the purchased transgenic animal is re-
construction, and without an express or implied license to do so, the
purchaser of the transgenic animal would be liable for
infringement."'
103. See infra notes 148-59.
104. See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
105. Desirable traits include exceptional hardiness, greater longevity, or cancer
susceptibility.
106. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 69-70 ahd accompanying text.
108. Id.
109. Maintaining an animal's health would be an example of maintaining its fit-
ness for use. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
110. Production of a new animal through reproduction appears to be recreation of
the patented machine. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
111. Patent infringement occurs when an unauthorized person makes, sells, or uses
the patented product or machine. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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The sale of this class of transgenic animals would create an im-
plied license to make new transgenic animals because this is its only
use."' As the implied license to make new transgenic animals is of
little value without an accompanying implied license to use and sell
the transgenic animals produced, these licenses will be implied.,"
With this class of transgenic animals, a sale of the animal causes the
purchaser to gain a license to make, use, and sell the progeny pro-
duced." 4 Thus, a more appropriate method of transfer such as a field
of use license should be selected," 5 if such a transfer is absolutely
required.
B. Transfer of Transgenic Animals Using Field of Use Licenses
Given the limited amount of control a patentee may maintain over
a transgenic animal machine that is sold to a purchaser," 6 other
methods of transferring these animals must be investigated. One al-
ternative transfer method is to license the third party to use the
transgenic animal in a specific field.
In general, the limited monopoly granted by a patent can be sub-
divided in various ways."" The patent right consists of:
several substantive rights, and each is the subject of subdivision, so that one
person may be permitted to make, but neither to sell nor use the patented
thing. To another may be conveyed the right to sell, but within a limited
area, or for a particular use, while to another the patentee may grant only
the right to make and use, or to use only for specific purposes.118
Licenses granting the licensee various portions of the patent rights,
112. Because the transgenic animals intended use is to introduce a trait into a herd
of animals, production of new animals is required. See supra note 77 and accompanying
text.
113. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 77 and 100 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 116-31 and accompanying text.
116. Poirier v. Bradford, 119 Minn. 475, 138 N.W. 687 (1912); Curtiss Aeroplane
& Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 266 F. 71 (2d Cir. 1928); see also supra
note 100 and accompanying text.
117. Comment, The Nature of a Patent Right, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 663 (1917).
118. Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 46 (1912), overruled on other grounds,
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
including territorial restricted rights 1 9 and rights restricted to a spe-
cific field of use,' 20 have been used.
1. Licenses Restricting the Field of Use of the
Patented Article
A patentee may license others to make and sell a patented article
for a particular use or may accomplish substantially the same effect
by limiting the particular class of customers to which the patented
articles may be sold. 1 2 1 Licenses restricting the field of use of the
patented article are not illegal per se as held by the Supreme Court
in General Talking Pictures v. Western Electric.122 The defendant
that was sued for patent infringement in General Talking Pictures
had purchased a patented amplifier with notice that its use was re-
stricted to noncommercial fields from a licensee who could only sell
to customers using the amplifiers for noncommercial purposes. The
defendant had sold the amplifier for commercial use. The Court held
that the defendant had infringed the patent and thus enforced the
field of use restriction present in the license. 23 It is important to
note that the licensee in General Talking Pictures was a manufac-
turing licensee rather than a reseller. Thus, the restrictive license
was not illegal per se under antitrust law because the patented arti-
cle did not pass into the stream of commerce until sold. 24 This dis-
tinction between a reseller and a manufacturing licensee is critical
because:
under a license to manufacture and sell, the patented article has not passed
into the stream of commerce until it is sold by the licensee. Up to that point
- when the patent has been fully practiced and the patented article is com-
pleted - the patent grants the patentee the power to place restrictions on the
use or sale of the patented article. But once the patented article is sold, the
patentee loses all power to control its future use of sale."' 5
Therefore, a patentee may place a restriction on the first sale of a
patented article by a manufacturing licensee' 28 but cannot place re-
strictions on the patented article after the first sale of the patented
119. "The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may convey
an exclusive right under his application for patents, patents to the whole or any specified
part of the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1986). This section is the basis for placing
territorial restrictions on a patent licensee. But see Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall)
453 (1883) (a patentee cannot place a territorial restriction on a patented article after
the first sale).
120. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938),





125. Munters Corp. v. Burgess Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1195, 1203 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), affd, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 756, 758 (SD.N.Y. 1978).
126. General Talking Pictures v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), ajfd on
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article.127 The courts will allow license restrictions.as long as the re-
strictions do "not attach a condition . . that will enlarge [the] mo-
nopoly granted.' 2 ' For example, restrictions limiting the use of a
patented machine to produce only a certain type of product,'129 or to
manufacture a product and sell it only to a certain class of custom-
ers,1 30 would not violate current antitrust law.
However, any attempts by a manufacturing licensee to attach field
of use restrictions to a patented product sold have been found a vio-
lation of antitrust law.' 3' Because the patentee does not have control
over patented articles once they are sold under such a license, the
restrictions must be placed in the license rather than attached to the
article at the time of sale.
2. Licensee Agreements Involving Transgenic Animals
Licenses restricting the field of use of the patented product may
only be used with manufacturing licensees or such restrictions will
violate antitrust laws.'- 2 Therefore, it is important to assure that the
license granted is drafted in a way to make the licensee a manufac-
turing licensee.
reh'g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938), reh'g denied, 305 US. 675 (1939).
127. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 41 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), a f'd in
part, rev'd in part, 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
128. Williams v. Hughes Tool Co., 186 F.2d 278, 284 (10th Cir. 1950).
129. Turner Glass Corp. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 173 F. 2d 49 (7th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 830 (1949), reh'g, denied, 338 U.S. 881 (1949); Q-Tips, Inc. v.
Johnson & Johnson, 109 F. Supp. 657 (D.N.J. 1951), modified, 207 F.2d 509 (3d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954) (patent owner may control the style of products
produced by a patented machine).
130. General Talking Pictures v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), aff'd on
reh'g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938), reh'g denied, 305 U.S. 675 (1939); Armstrong v. Motorola,
Inc., 374 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967), reh'g denied, 389
U.S. 997 (1967); Benger Laboratories, Ltd. v. R. K. Laros Co., 209 F. Supp. 639, 648
(E.D. Pa. 1962), affid, 317 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963)
(exclusive license by patentee restricted the licensee to sell only in the human field); Hull
v. Brunswick Corp., 704 F.2d 1195 (10th Cir. 1983) (patentee maintains some control
over the patented product produced); see also 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 19.04[3] (1936).
131. Univis Lens Co., 41 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), affid in part, rev'd in
part, 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
132. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
a. Field of Use Licenses Restricting the Use of Transgenic
Animals Used as a Specialized Food Source
Licensing a transgenic animal to a licensee to be used as a special-
ized food source using a field of use license can be viewed as licens-
ing a product.1"' Any attempt to use a field of use license with this
particular class of transgenic animals will result in a violation of an-
titrust laws because the licensee would simply be a reseller rather
than a manufacturer. The courts have rarely allowed any field of use
restrictions to attach to a patented article once it is sold. 3
This class of transgenic animals appears to be adequately pro-
tected when sold' 35 and the patentee is afforded little extra control
over the invention by using a field of use license of questionable
validity.
b. Field of Use Licenses Restricting the Use of a Transgenic
Animal Machine Producing a Valuable Product or Byproduct
Licensing a transgenic animal used to produce a valuable product
and additional incident transgenic animals using a field of use license
can be viewed as licensing a self-replicating machine with a re-
stricted field of use.'36 The patentee could grant a field of use license
that limited the licensee's use of the transgenic animals or "trans-
genic factories" transferred to the production of a valuable product.
This would only allow the animal to be used in the production of the
valuable product and would create an implied license to produce only
those new transgenic animals required to produce that valuable
product.'3
7
This type of field of use license limiting the type of product that
may be manufactured by the licensee is very common and is not an
antitrust violation. 3 8 The patentee may also control the class of cus-
tomers to whom the valuable product or the incidentally produced
transgenic animals may be sold without violating the antitrust
laws. 13 9 For example, the patentee may require that the transgenic
animals be sold to the patentee, 40 to a slaughterhouse, or that all
133. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
134. United States v. Consolidated Car-Heating Co., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 489
(S.D.N.Y. 1950); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Sys., 169 F.
Supp. I (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd per curium, 268 F. 2d 395 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 894 (1959). But see Chemagro Corp. v. Universal Chem. Co., 244 F. Supp. 486
(E.D. Tex 1965) (purchasee who has notice of a restriction on the use of the purchased,
patented article is bound by that restriction).
135. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1991); see also supra note 90 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 130.
140. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938),
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progeny be sterilized. The grant of a license with a restricted field of
use would seem to be a good way to adequately protect the paten-
tee's position when transferring a transgenic animal producing a val-
uable product in its milk.
c. Field of Use Licenses Restricting the Use of a Transgenic
Animal Machine Used to Introduce a Special Characteristic into
a Herd
Licensing a transgenic animal used to introduce a special charac-
teristic into a herd with a field of use license can be viewed as licens-
ing a biological machine for the restricted purpose of producing
more transgenic animals having a particular special characteristic.' 4'
The patentee could grant a license to a licensee to produce new
transgenic animals only for use in the licensee's own herd and not for
sale to others. This license is similar to the field of use license in
General Talking Pictures that limited the use of amplifiers produced
to the noncommercial market. 42
Because this class of transgenic animal can be viewed as a pat-
ented machine used to produce a specific product, a license limiting
the use of that product to a specific field would not violate antitrust
law. In addition, a license limiting the sale of the transgenic animals
to a certain class of customer would be effective in controlling the
transgenic progeny and would not violate antitrust law.
C. Other Methods of Transferring Transgenic Animals
Various commentators have suggested using either a lease14.
3 of
the transgenic animal or a bailment.
144
1. Transfer of Transgenic Animals Using a Bailment
The use of a common law bailment to transfer any of the trans-
genic animal inventions has the distinct advantage of maintaining
ownership of that animal with the patentee."4 However, one serious
a.ffd on reh'g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938), reh'g denied, 305 U.S. 675 (1939).
141. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
142. General Talking Pictures Corp. v Western Elec. Co., 304 US. 175 (1938),
affd on reh'g, 305 U.S 124 (1938), reh'g denied, 305 U.S. 675 (1939).
143. Schramm, Leases of Machinery and the Antitrust Laws, XL J. PAT. OFF.
SOC'Y 110 (1958).
144. Kirn, The Use of Common Law Bailments in Connection with the Licensing
of Living Organisms, 9 LICENSING L. Bus. REP. 1-10 (Sept. & Oct. 1986).
145. Id.
disadvantage in using a bailment to transfer a transgenic animal in-
vention is that bailments have not been extensively used to transfer
patented products and machines to a third party.146 Therefore, there
are relatively few cases dealing with bailments in this context and
there is little experience by practitioners. 47
2. Transfer of Transgenic Animals Using a Lease
Leases have been extensively used to transfer patented products
and machines.' 48 An implied license is overridden by express lease
clauses to the contrary requiring the return of patented articles for
repair and refurbishment. 49 A lease would also appear to create an
implied license to use a patented process in operating a patented ma-
chine as does the sale of a patented machine that is only useful in
carrying out a patented process. 50
The use of a lease to transfer a patented product of a machine
prevents the doctrine of patent exhaustion from applying. Because
title to the patented article never passes to the lessee, the lessee
never becomes a purchaser.' 51 Despite the patentee maintaining title
to the patented article, the courts have refused to enforce restrictive
leases that attempt to extend the lessor's control beyond that granted
by the patent. 5 2 Restrictions are in violation of antitrust law1
3 if
they attempt to control either (a) the price of an unpatented product
produced by a leased, patented machine15 4 or (b) the use of a com-
petitor's supplies or other machines used with the leased patented
machine.
5 1
Leases of a patented article containing restrictions that do not at-
tempt to extend the rights of the patentee beyond the rights granted
by the patent have been upheld by the courts. 56 For example, a
lease of a patented furnace requiring that it only be used to produce
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Schramm, Leases of Machinery and the Antitrust Laws, XL J. PAT. OFF
Soc'Y 110 (1958).
149. Robertson Rock Bit Co. v. Hughes Tool Co., 176 F.2d. 783 (5th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1949).
150. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
151. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852) (court held that once
title had passed to purchaser, patent rights in the article sold were exhausted).
152. Turner Glass Corp. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 173 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 830 (1949), reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 881 (1949) (limiting the use of
leased machinery is not an antitrust violation if the limiting condition is reasonably
within the reward the patentee is entitled to).
153. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. U.S., 323 U.S. 386 (1945), modified, 324
U.S. 570 (1945).
155. See, e.g., Chiplet, Inc. v. June Dairy Products, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 814 (D.N.J.
1950).
156. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 28: 937. 1991] Biotech Babies
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
a particular product has been declared enforceable under the anti-
trust laws.' Thus, it appears that a lease containing field of use
restrictions similar to that in General Talking Pictures58 is
enforceable.
Leasing appears to have advantages over a sale of a patented arti-
cle similar to the advantages provided by a field of use license. The
application of a lease to the three types of transgenic animal inven-
tion transfers would therefore be similar, if not identical, to a field of
use license.'
59
IV. OTHER SELF-REPLICATING BIOTECHNOLOGY INVENTIONS
This Comment has specifically addressed the transfer of three hy-
pothetical transgenic animal inventions. However, the patent law and
antitrust law doctrines governing the transfer of a transgenic animal
invention also apply to the transfer of other self-replicating biotech-
nology inventions. Self-replicating biotechnology inventions include
microorganisms, such as bacteria and yeast, 160 in vitro cell lines de-
rived from plants' 6' or animals,' 62 genetically altered microorga-
nisms, 63 genetically altered animal cells, 6  and transgenic plants.
65
Each of these self-replicating biotechnology inventions can be clas-
sified as primarily a product or a machine that produces a product.
This classification simplifies the determination of any limits placed
on the production of progeny from the original self-replicating inven-
tion at the time of the transfer. For example, a yeast or bacteria
157. United States v. Consolidated Car-Heating Co., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 489
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
158. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938),
afl'd on reh'g, 305 U..S. 124 (1938), reh'g denied, 305 U.S. 675 (1939).
159. See supra notes 116-42 and accompanying text.
160. See S. BENT, INTEL. PROP. RTS., supra note 46.
161. Matzke & Chilton, Site-Specific Insertion of Genes Into T-DNA of
Agrobacterium Tumor Inducing Plasmid: An Approach To Genetic Engineering of
Higher Plant Cells, 1 J. MOLECULAR & APPLIED GENETICS 39 (1981).
162. See, e.g., Golde & Quan, Unique T-Lymphocyte Line and Products Derived
Therefrom, U.S. Pat. No. 4,438,032 (1984).
163. Villa-Komoraff, Effstratiadis, Broome, Lomedico, Tizard, Naber, Chick &
Gilbert, A Bacterial Clone Synthesizing Proinsulin, 75 PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 3727
(1978); Goeddel, Kleid, Bolivar, Heyneker, Yansur, Crea, Hirose, Kraszewski & Riggs,
Expression in Escherichia Culi of Chemically Synthesized Genes for Human Insulin, 76
PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SC. 106 (1979).
164. Gething & Sambrook, Construction of Influenza Haemagglutinin Genes That
Code for Intracellular and Secreted Forms of the Protein, 300 NATURE 598 (1982).
165. Haitt, Cafferkey & Browdish, Production of Antibodies in Transgenic Plants,
342 NATURE 76 (1989).
culture used in making cheese or beer 6 6 would be considered a prod-
uct under this classification system because the culture is destroyed
before its intended use is completed and the culture of microorga-
nisms 117 is not reproduced. Thus, the culture of microorganisms is
similar to a transgenic animal used as a specialized food source be-
cause they are both products and thus would be afforded a similar
analysis under patent and antitrust law." 8
Other examples of biological machines include genetically altered
microorganisms, animal cells or plants, and microorganisms and cell
lines that secrete a valuable product.6 A plant or microorganism
that could be used to introduce a special characteristic, such as dis-
ease resistance into a population of similar organisms, would be clas-
sified as a biological machine. This biological machine would be
similar to a transgenic animal used to introduce a special character-




The variation in the use of each of the three classes of transgenic
animals leads to the patentee maintaining different amounts of con-
trol over any transgenic progeny produced. By determining whether
a transgenic animal invention is intended to be used as a product or
a self-replicating machine, the method of transferring the invention
can be selected to maximize the patentee's post-transfer control.
Transgenic progeny produced from transgenic animal products,
such as those transferred to a third party to be used as a specialized
food source, can be transferred using an unconditional sale. After an
unconditional sale, the limits placed on making new patented articles
by the patent law doctrine of impermissible reconstruction and pat-
ent infringement statutes maintain the patentee's control over these
animals.
The patentee has limited control over transgenic progeny inciden-
tally produced from self-replicating machines, such as transgenic an-
imals producing a valuable product or transgenic animals produced
by a transgenic animal sold to a third party to introduce a special-
ized trait into a new transgenic progeny. Therefore, to maximize the
166. Jeffers, Restriction of Propagation of Patented Bacteria Sold by Patentee-
Can It Be Done?, 70 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 75 (1988).
167. The microorganism may replicate during the production of the product, but a
new culture of pure microorganisms is not made. Thus, there is not reconstruction or
infringement. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 161-62.
170. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
[VOL 28: 937, 1991] Biotech Babies
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
patentee's control, these animals should be licensed or leased with an
appropriate field of use restriction placed on the transgenic progeny.
JEFFREY W. GuisE

